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I.

INTRODUCTION

Inherited genetic disorders are a well-known cause of
developmental delays in children. It is, therefore, “foreseeable” to
physicians treating developmentally delayed children that parents
of these children will rely on the physicians’ opinions of whether a
† Mark Hallberg is a member of the law firm of Hallberg & McClain, P.A.,
practicing in the area of plaintiff’s personal injury and medical malpractice. He is
adjunct faculty at William Mitchell College of Law, where he teaches the Medical
Malpractice seminar. He is Certified in Civil Trial Advocacy by the National Board
of Trial Advocacy, and the MSBA Civil Litigation Section. He is a fellow of the
American College of Trial Lawyers.
†† Teresa Fariss McClain is a member of the law firm of Hallberg & McClain,
P.A., practicing in the area of plaintiff’s medical malpractice. Prior to entering the
practice of law, she practiced as a registered nurse in the areas of obstetrics and
adult critical care. After graduation from William Mitchell College of Law in 2001,
she clerked for the Honorable Donald P. Lay of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.
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genetic cause exists. Accordingly in 1992, when Dr. Diane Meier, a
pediatrician, discovered developmental delays in S.F., the three1
year-old daughter of Kimberly Flomer (now Molloy) and Robert
Flomer, “accepted standards of pediatric practice” required Dr.
2
Meier to order genetic testing, including testing for Fragile X
Syndrome, one of the most common causes of inherited mental
3
retardation. The foreseeable consequences of Dr. Meier’s alleged
failure to obtain Fragile X testing and the timing of those
consequences provide the factual basis for a genetic counseling
medical malpractice action that raises unique and challenging
issues involving the legal duty of a physician to a non-patient, the
accrual of a cause of action for statute of limitations purposes, and
the ability of parents to bring a wrongful conception cause of
4
action for the birth of a child with a genetic disorder. In the case
of Molloy v. Meier, the Minnesota Supreme Court analyzed these
issues following a denial of summary judgment by the district court
5
and affirmance by the Minnesota Court of Appeals.
The purpose of this note is to analyze the court’s discussion of
these issues, identify questions raised by the court’s rationale and
its holding, and offer suggestions on how these questions might be
addressed in the future.
II. STATEMENT OF FACTS
S.F. came under the care and treatment of Dr. Diane M.
6
Meier, a pediatrician, at an early age. When S.F. was three years
7
old, Dr. Meier discovered that S.F. was developmentally delayed.
On May 18, 1992, Dr. Meier met with Molloy, Robert Flomer, and
S.F. to discuss possible causes for S.F.’s developmental delays,
8
including the possibility of a genetic cause. As a result of that
meeting, Dr. Meier agreed to order genetic tests to determine if
9
S.F. had an inherited genetic disorder.

1. Kimberly Flomer later married Glenn Molloy, and took his surname. For
the sake of convenience, this article will most often refer to her simply as “Molloy.”
2. See Molloy v. Meier, 679 N.W.2d 711, 714 (Minn. 2004).
3. Id. n.2.
4. See id. at 716.
5. Id. at 715–16.
6. Id. at 713–14.
7. Id. at 714.
8. Id.
9. See id.
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Dr. Meier’s notes and her subsequent testimony establish that
she intended to order chromosomal testing and testing for Fragile
10
X Syndrome. Fragile X Syndrome is an “X-linked” single gene
11
disorder. Dr. Meier conceded “it was appropriate to test [S.F.] for
Fragile X in keeping with accepted standards of pediatric practice
12
on May 18, 1992.” Molloy contended that if S.F. tested positive for
the genetic disorder, Molloy should have been tested as well,
13
though Dr. Meier did not concede this.
Pursuant to Dr. Meier’s directions, S.F. underwent genetic
14
testing at North Memorial Medical Center on June 17, 1992.
Although she intended to order both chromosome and Fragile X
testing, Dr. Meier testified that no testing for Fragile X was
15
performed.
On July 18, 1992, North Memorial’s laboratory
16
reported to Dr. Meier that the chromosome testing was “normal.”
Thereafter, Dr. Meier telephoned Molloy and Robert Flomer and
17
advised them that the test results were “normal.”
Molloy and
Flomer assumed that the Fragile X testing had been completed as
well, and therefore assumed that the negative or normal test results
18
included a negative result for Fragile X.
In addition to examinations by Dr. Meier, S.F. was examined
on June 23, 1992, by Dr. Reno Backus, a pediatric neurologist, and
on April 30, 1996, by Dr. Kathryn Green, also a pediatric
19
neurologist. Neither Dr. Backus nor Dr. Green recommended or
20
ordered testing for Fragile X Syndrome. The plaintiff identified
expert testimony stating that accepted standards of medical
practice under the circumstances required Dr. Backus and Dr.
Green to consider a genetic cause for S.F.’s pervasive

10. Id.
11. A person with Fragile X Syndrome has a mutation of the DNA on the
FMR1 gene of the X chromosome that results in a failure of the person to make a
specific protein. The absence of this protein sets in motion a cascade of
biochemical events that result in the characteristics of Fragile X Syndrome.
Accordingly, a child can inherit an X chromosome carrying the mutant FMR1
gene from either or both parents. See id. at 714 n.2.
12. Id. at 714.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. n.3.
16. Id. at 714.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 714–15.
20. Id. at 715.
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developmental delay and to order genetic testing, including a test
21
for Fragile X Syndrome.
Sometime after 1992, Kimberly Flomer married Glenn
22
Molloy. On June 30, 1998, Kimberly Molloy gave birth to M.M.,
23
who showed signs of the same developmental difficulties as S.F.
M.M.’s pediatrician ordered Fragile X testing and the results were
24
positive. M.M.’s pediatrician then counseled Kimberly and Glenn
Molloy about Fragile X Syndrome and recommended that they and
25
other potentially affected family members receive testing.
Subsequent tests revealed that both S.F. and Kimberly Molloy
26
tested positive for Fragile X. Molloy commenced a cause of action
27
against Drs. Meier, Backus, and Green on August 23, 2001. After
28
some discovery, defendants moved for summary judgment.
The district court denied defendants’ motion for summary
29
judgment and certified three questions to the court of appeals.
The court of appeals affirmed the district court and review was
30
granted by the Minnesota Supreme Court. The three certified
questions were as follows:
(a) Does a physician who allegedly fails to test for and
diagnose a genetic disorder in an existing child leading to
the birth of a subsequent child with that disorder owe a
legal duty to the child’s parents?
(b) When does the statute of limitations begin to run
pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 541.076 (2002) in a parents’
medical negligence claim alleging failure to test for and
diagnose a genetic disorder in an existing child leading to
the birth of a subsequent child with that disorder?
(c) Does Minn. Stat. § 145.424 prohibit parents from
bringing an action alleging that they would not have
conceived the subsequent child described in question
31
(b)?

21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 715.
Id. at 715–16.
Id. at 713, 716.
Id. at 716.
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The court of appeals used Skillings v. Allen to guide its analysis
in determining whether a duty runs to the parents in this case. In
Skillings, a physician negligently advised the parents of a minor
child regarding the safety of visiting their child who was
hospitalized with scarlet fever. Relying on the physician’s advice,
the parents visited their child, and subsequently both parents
33
contracted scarlet fever. In holding that the physician was liable
for negligently advising the parents, and finding that a duty flowed
from the physician to the minor patient’s parents, the Skillings
court held that the parents received negligent advice from the
physician, and that it was foreseeable the parents would rely on this
34
advice.
In Molloy, the court of appeals reasoned that, as in
Skillings, there was evidence in the record that Kimberly Molloy
received and relied upon direct advice from the defendants. The
court noted that the genetic testing that was discussed was not
ordered to benefit S.F., but to inform Molloy whether she was a
35
carrier for the genetic abnormality. The court concluded that the
physicians involved had a duty to properly advise S.F.’s biological
parents when advising about the risks of conceiving a subsequent
36
child.
Next, the court of appeals considered the question of when
the cause of action accrued. Citing Offerdahl v. University of
37
38
Minnesota Hospital & Clinics and Peterson v. St. Cloud Hospital, the
court held that it is the alleged negligence combined with the alleged
resulting damage that determines when the cause of action
39
accrues. Finding that damage did not occur until conception of
M.M., the court held that the cause of action accrued in
September, 1997, and therefore was not time-barred by the
40
limitations period in Minnesota Statutes section 541.076. Finally,
the court held that the plain language of Minnesota Statutes
41
section 145.424 does not prohibit wrongful conception actions.

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

143 Minn. 323, 173 N.W. 663 (1919).
143 Minn. at 324, 173 N.W. at 663.
143 Minn. at 324–25, 173 N.W. at 663.
Molloy v. Meier, 660 N.W.2d 444 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003).
Id. at 453.
426 N.W.2d 425, 429 (Minn. 1988).
460 N.W.2d 635 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990).
Molloy, 660 N.W.2d at 455.
Id. at 456.
Id.
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III. SUPREME COURT’S ANALYSIS
A. A Physician’s Duty to Inform Biological Parents About Genetic
Implications of a Child’s Genetic Disorder
The issue regarding legal duty was framed as follows: Molloy
argued that a physician-patient relationship existed between her
and the physician defendants that “gave rise to a legal duty to warn
her about the risks of becoming pregnant as a carrier of Fragile
42
X.”
Molloy further argued that “even if a physician-patient
relationship [could not] be established, a physician’s duty to warn
[non-patients] of a patient’s genetic disorder arises from the
43
foreseeability of injury.”
The physicians, on the other hand,
argued they owed a duty only to S.F., and such duty did not extend
44
to any family members.
A medical malpractice action is based upon the principles of
tort liability for negligence. To establish a prima facie case of
medical malpractice for negligent medical treatment, a plaintiff
must show:
(1) the standard of care recognized by the medical
community as applicable to the particular defendant’s
conduct;
(2) that the defendant in fact departed from that
standard;
(3) that the defendant’s departure from that standard was
a direct cause of the patient’s injuries; and
45
(4) legal damages.
Generally, the legal duty arises from the physician-patient
relationship. Therefore, the existence of a physician-patient
relationship is an essential element of proof in a medical
46
malpractice action.
The physician-patient relationship is a
fiduciary relationship in which it is foreseeable that negligent or
42. Molloy v. Meier, 679 N.W.2d 711, 716 (Minn. 2004).
43. Id. at 716–17. See, e.g., Lundgren v. Fultz, 354 N.W.2d 25, 28–29 (Minn.
1984); Skillings v. Allen, 143 Minn. 323, 173 N.W. 663 (1919).
44. Molloy, 679 N.W.2d at 717; see also McElwain v. Van Beek, 447 N.W.2d 442,
446 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989).
45. Plutshack v. Univ. of Minn. Hosp., 316 N.W.2d 1, 5 (Minn. 1982); Miller v.
Raaen, 273 Minn. 109, 113, 139 N.W.2d 877, 880 (1966) (including actual loss or
damage as an element of malpractice).
46. McElwain, 447 N.W.2d at 445 (requiring doctor to exercise a certain
degree of care and skill until the end of the doctor-patient relationship).
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below standard care will result in harm; thus, the existence of a
47
duty.
The question whether a physician owes a duty to inform a
child’s biological parents about genetic implications of that child’s
48
genetic disorder was one of first impression in Minnesota. The
supreme court began its analysis by noting that the existence of a
duty to a third party who is not a patient of the physician had been
49
recognized in only a few Minnesota cases.
For example, in
50
Skillings, a minor child was hospitalized with scarlet fever. When
the parents asked the child’s physician about the nature of the
disease and the risk of infection, the physician negligently
informed the parents that they could safely visit their daughter in
the hospital and take her home even though the disease was in its
51
most contagious stage. The Molloy court quoted Skillings for the
proposition that “one is responsible for the direct consequences of
his negligent actions whenever he is placed in such a position with
regard to another that it is obvious that if he does not use due care
52
in his own conduct, he will cause injury to that person.”
The
Molloy court added that “liability extends to the parents because the
physician had an obligation to use due care in a situation where it
53
was likely known that the parents would rely on the advice.”
54
Similarly, the Molloy court relied upon Cairl v. State. In Cairl,
the court held that a treatment facility might owe a duty to warn
identifiable third parties of violent propensities of a mentally
disabled youth whom it released if that youth posed a specific
55
threat to those parties.
56
Finally, the court relied upon Lundgren v. Fultz. The facts in
Lundgren emphasize the roles of foreseeability and control or ability

47. Id.
48. Molloy, 679 N.W.2d at 717.
49. Id. (citing Lundgren v. Fultz, 354 N.W.2d 25 (Minn. 1984); Cairl v. State,
323 N.W.2d 20 (Minn. 1982); Skillings v. Allen, 143 Minn. 323, 173 N.W. 663
(1919)).
50. 143 Minn. at 324, 173 N.W. at 663.
51. Id.
52. Molloy, 679 N.W.2d at 717 (citing Skillings, 143 Minn. at 325-26, 173 N.W.
at 663–64).
53. Id. at 717.
54. See 323 N.W.2d at 25–26 (finding a duty to warn when a specific threat is
made against specific victims).
55. Id. at 25.
56. See 354 N.W.2d at 25.
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57

to control in the determination of legal duty. In Lundgren, the
action was commenced by the husband of a woman who was killed
58
by a psychiatrist’s patient in a random act of violence.
The
evidence established that the psychiatrist had treated the patient
for paranoid schizophrenia that manifested itself in violent and
59
threatening behaviors.
After a period of treatment including
psychotropic medications, the patient appeared to be in
60
remission. At one point in the treatment process, the University
of Minnesota Police Department suggested that the patient’s guns
61
be confiscated. The treating psychiatrist and the patient’s wife
62
agreed, and the guns were brought to the police for safekeeping.
After the patient’s release from treatment, he sought return of his
63
guns from the university police.
The police contacted the
psychiatrist and the psychiatrist wrote a letter stating that the
patient had recovered from his mental illness and that the guns
64
could be returned to the patient. After receiving the letter, the
police turned over the guns to the patient who, several months
later, used one of the guns to shoot and kill the plaintiff’s wife in
65
an “unprovoked and random attack.”
The trial court granted summary judgment, asserting that the
defendant psychiatrist had no duty to control the conduct of a
third person to prevent the third person from causing injury or
66
harm to another. The Minnesota Supreme Court noted that the
psychiatrist had played an active role in allowing his patient to have
access to the guns and, therefore, there was a genuine issue of fact
as to whether the psychiatrist had the ability to control the access to
67
the guns and whether there was foreseeable harm.
The court
noted, “Foreseeability has been called the fundamental basis of the
law of negligence. Justice Cardozo succinctly expressed the central
relationship between the foreseeability of harm and the existence
of a legal duty in Palsgraf, stating that ‘the risk reasonably to be

57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Id. at 28 (imposing duty to control when the harm is foreseeable).
Id. at 26–27.
Id. at 26.
Id.
Id. at 27.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 26.
Id. at 28.
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perceived defines the duty to be obeyed. . . .’” The Lundgren court
held that close questions on foreseeability should be submitted to
69
the jury.
In citing Skillings, Cairl, and Lundgren, the Molloy court
recognized and followed the long established legal precedent that
foreseeability of harm defines legal duty.
The court also
referenced an attorney malpractice case, Togstad v. Vesely, Otto,
Miller & Keefe, noting the importance of the client’s reliance upon
the advice of the attorney, and finding that there was sufficient
evidence to support an attorney-client relationship because it was
reasonably foreseeable that negligent advice would injure the
70
plaintiff.
The Molloy court also found persuasive decisions from other
jurisdictions that held that a physician owed a legal duty to the
family of a patient who received negligent care in the field of
71
genetics. The Molloy court found the analysis of the Supreme
Court of Florida in the case of Pate v. Threlkel particularly helpful.
There the Florida court held that a duty exists where “the
prevailing standard of care creates a duty that is obviously for the
benefit of certain identified third parties and the physician knows
72
of the existence of those third parties.” Following the example of
Pate, the Molloy court observed that
the legal duty of physicians will be driven, at least in part,
by the standard of care in the medical profession. As this
occurs, it is unlikely that the medical community will
adopt a standard of care that is either unduly burdensome

68. Id. (quoting Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 100 (N.Y.
1928)); see also Christianson v. Chicago, St. Paul, Mpls. & Omaha Ry. Co., 67 Minn.
94, 97, 69 N.W. 640, 641 (1896) (Mitchell, J.) (“What a man may reasonably
anticipate is important, and may be decisive, in determining whether an act is
negligent.”); W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 31, 43 (4th ed.
1971).
69. Lundgren v. Fultz, 354 N.W.2d 25, 28 (Minn. 1984).
70. Togstad v. Vesely, Otto, Miller & Keefe, 291 N.W.2d 686, 693 (Minn.
1980).
71. Molloy v. Meier, 679 N.W.2d 711, 718 (Minn. 2004) (citing Schroeder v.
Perkel, 432 A.2d 834, 839 (N.J. 1981) (holding that where a physician failed to
diagnose cystic fibrosis in a first-born child, it was foreseeable that the parents
would rely on the diagnosis, leading to the conception and birth of a second child
with cystic fibrosis, and consequently liability attached); Lininger v. Eisenbaum,
764 P.2d 1202, 1205 (Colo. 1988) (holding the failure of a physician to diagnose a
hereditary cause of blindness resulting in the conception of a subsequent child
born with blindness stated a cause of action)).
72. Pate v. Threlkel, 661 So. 2d 278, 282 (Fla. 1995).
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or unbeneficial to patients. . . . The standard of care thus
acknowledges that families rely on physicians to
communicate a diagnosis of the genetic disorder to the
patient’s family.
It is foreseeable that a negligent
diagnosis of Fragile X will cause harm not only to the
73
patient, but to the family of the patient as well.
The court then held that a “physician’s duty regarding genetic
testing and diagnosis extends beyond the patient to the biological
74
parents who foreseeably may be harmed by a breach of that duty.”
In this case, the parents were of childbearing years and it was
foreseeable that they would conceive another child absent the
75
knowledge of the genetic disorder. The doctors therefore owed a
76
duty not only to S.F., but also to her parents. The scope of that
duty could be determined by the accepted standards of practice.
The court’s holding on legal duty was limited to the biological
77
parents. The court did not address whether the duty recognized
in Molloy extends beyond biological parents to others who
foreseeably will rely on genetic testing and diagnosis and,
therefore, foreseeably may be injured by the negligence in
78
discharging the duty of care.
In summary, the Molloy court relied upon the evidence of a
standard of care to test for genetic disorders under these
circumstances in concluding that not only did biological parents
rely upon genetic counseling under these circumstances, but that it
was foreseeable that negligent counseling would result in harm.
79
That duty is defined by the foreseeability of harm.
B. Genetic Counseling Action “Accrued” on Date of “Legal” Damage
The second certified question concerned the application of
Minnesota Statutes section 541.076 (b). This statute provides that a
medical malpractice cause of action “must be commenced within
80
four years from the date the cause of action accrued.” Molloy
commenced her cause of action in August of 2001, more than four

73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

Molloy, 679 N.W.2d at 719.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 720.
Id.
Id.
MINN. STAT. § 541.076 (b) (2002).
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years after S.F.’s last treatment by any of the defendants, but within
four years of the date of M.M.’s conception and birth.
Minnesota courts have long applied the so-called “termination
81
of treatment” rule to establish when a cause of action accrues.
The termination of treatment rule recognizes that where the
negligence is a failure to properly diagnose and treat a condition, it
may be difficult to determine when in the course of treatment the
82
physician breached a duty. Under those circumstances, the courts
have applied the termination of treatment rule and have held that
a medical malpractice cause of action will not accrue until the
83
patient ceases treatment with the defendant physician.
Essentially, under this rule, it is assumed that the negligent conduct
of the physician occurred on the last date of treatment unless the
84
plaintiff’s injury was caused by a discrete, identifiable act. The
defendant physicians advocated application of the termination of
treatment rule, arguing that the Molloys’ action was therefore time85
barred.
However, Minnesota courts have also held that a cause of
action does not “accrue” until it may be brought without dismissal
86
for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. As
stated in Offerdahl, “[a]lleged negligence coupled with the alleged
resulting damage is the gravamen in deciding the date when a
87
cause of action accrues.” An example of the application of this
88
rule is Peterson v. St. Cloud Hospital. In that case, a pathologist
negligently analyzed a specimen from a brain tumor and
89
concluded that the specimen was malignant. Several weeks later,
90
the patient began chemotherapy and radiation therapy. Several
months later, however, it was determined that the pathologist was

81. See Grondahl v. Bulluck, 318 N.W.2d 240, 243 (Minn. 1982); Schmitt v.
Esser, 178 Minn. 82, 86, 226 N.W. 196, 197 (1929).
82. See Offerdahl v. Univ. of Minn. Hosp. & Clinics, 426 N.W.2d 425, 429
(Minn. 1988) (citing Swang v. Hauser, 288 Minn. 306, 180 N.W.2d 187, 189
(1970)).
83. See Grondahl, 318 N.W.2d at 243; Schmitt, 226 N.W. at 197.
84. See Offerdahl, 426 N.W.2d at 429.
85. Molloy v. Meier, 679 N.W.2d 711, 720 (Minn. 2004).
86. Dalton v. Dow Chem. Co., 280 Minn. 147, 152–53, 158 N.W.2d 580, 584
(1968).
87. 426 N.W.2d at 429 (applying the holdings of Dalton in the medical
malpractice context).
88. 460 N.W.2d 635 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990).
89. Id. at 637.
90. Id.
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91

in error and that the patient did not have a malignant condition.
The patient commenced a medical malpractice action against
92
the pathologist.
At the time the action was commenced, the
statute of limitations for medical malpractice actions was two years
93
The plaintiff
from the date the cause of action accrued.
commenced his action more than two years after the date of the
misdiagnosis but less than two years after the date he began
94
chemotherapy treatment.
The court of appeals held that the
patient sustained no harm until the date of chemotherapy and,
95
therefore, the cause of action did not accrue until that date. Prior
to the date of chemotherapy, the plaintiff’s cause of action would
96
not have survived a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.
Relying upon the rationale of Offerdahl and Peterson, Molloy
argued that there was no harm until M.M. was conceived and,
97
therefore, the cause of action did not accrue until that date.
Stated another way, any action commenced by Molloy prior to the
date of M.M.’s conception would have not survived a motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be
98
granted.
The supreme court’s analysis in Molloy essentially treated the
task as one of statutory construction. The statute provided that the
cause of action “must be commenced within four years from the
99
date the cause of action accrued.” The Molloy court reasoned: “An
action does not ‘accrue’ until it may be brought without dismissal
100
for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.”
“According to Webster’s Dictionary, ‘accrue’ is defined as ‘to come
101
into existence as an enforceable claim: vest as a right.’”
“In the
context of a malpractice action, the action accrues when the
102
plaintiff establishes each of the four elements of negligence.”
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. MINN. STAT. §§ 541.01, 541.07(1) (1988).
94. Peterson, 460 N.W.2d at 637.
95. Id. at 639.
96. See id.
97. Molloy v. Meier, 679 N.W.2d 711, 720 (Minn. 2004).
98. Id.
99. Id. at 721 (quoting MINN. STAT. § 541.076(b) (2002) (emphasis added)).
100. Id. (citing Dalton v. Dow Chem. Co., 280 Minn. 147, 152–53, 158 N.W.2d
580, 584 (1968)).
101. Id. (quoting WEBSTER’S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 13 (3d ed.
1961)).
102. Id. (citing Plutshack v. Univ. of Minn. Hosps., 316 N.W.2d 1, 5 (Minn.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol31/iss3/6

12

Hallberg and Fariss: Molloy v. Meier Extends Genetic Counseling Duty of Care to Biolog
6HALLBERGMCCLAIN.DOC

2005]

3/13/2005 3:32:21 PM

GENETIC COUNSELING

951

The four elements of negligence are duty, breach of duty, causal
103
The Molloy court observed that even
harm, and legal damages.
though “there is no dispute that the alleged breach of duty
occurred on the last date of treatment for each physician . . . the
cause of action will not accrue until plaintiff has suffered some
injury, so the question is: What is the injury and when did it
104
occur?” It was Molloy’s claim that the harm occurred at the date
of conception and that all damages occurred on or after that date.
105
The defendant doctors cited Fabio v. Bellomo, arguing that in
a case of misdiagnosis, the action accrues on the date of the
106
Fabio raised the accrual issue in the context of the
misdiagnosis.
repeated failure of a physician to diagnose breast cancer in his
patient.
Understanding the facts in Fabio are crucial to
understanding its holding. The plaintiff in Fabio treated with the
107
defendant, Bellomo, from 1977 until 1986.
The plaintiff alleged
that on one occasion between 1982 and 1984 and on another
occasion, March 10, 1986, plaintiff had complained of a lump in
108
her left breast.
On both occasions, defendant Bellomo told
109
plaintiff “not to worry” because the lump was a fibrous mass.
After March 10, 1986, Dr. Bellomo retired and plaintiff switched
110
her care to another physician.
In 1987, that physician
recommended a mammogram and thereafter diagnosed a breast
111
The plaintiff
cancer that had metastasized to four lymph nodes.
offered expert testimony that Dr. Bellomo had departed from
accepted standards of practice in failing to offer mammography at
the time the plaintiff had complained of a lump prior to 1984 and
112
in 1986.
In addition, expert testimony established that the
cancer had “more probably than not” spread from the breast to the
113
However, the plaintiff
lymph nodes between 1984 and 1987.
failed to offer any evidence that her cancer would recur or that she

1982)).
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

PROSSER, supra note 68, at 143–45.
Molloy, 679 N.W.2d at 721.
504 N.W.2d 758 (Minn. 1993).
Molloy, 679 N.W.2d at 720.
Fabio, 504 N.W.2d at 760.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 761.
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114

had a diminished life expectancy.
Therefore, even after
diagnosis and treatment, it was “more probable” that the plaintiff
115
was cured of her cancer.
The plaintiff commenced a timely action alleging negligence
116
Prior to trial, plaintiff
for the misdiagnosis on March 10, 1986.
sought to amend her complaint to include an allegation of
117
negligence for the misdiagnosis that occurred prior to 1984. The
118
district court denied the motion to amend. The supreme court
affirmed the district holding that examination of the breast before
1984 was not part of a continuing course of treatment and the
motion to amend should be denied because more than two years
119
had passed.
The implication of the holding was that the statute
of limitations began to run on the date of misdiagnosis. However,
the court did not address if or when any legal damage had
occurred. There was an absence of proof on the extent of legal
damages and, therefore, denial of plaintiff’s motion to amend was
120
Importantly, the Fabio court did not
not an abuse of discretion.
decide, and did not even address, whether “some damages,” the
ongoing presence of cancer cells, was enough for the cause of
action to accrue.
Returning to Molloy, the defendants cited Fabio for the
proposition that “some damage occurs as ‘a matter of law’ when the
physician fails to make a correct diagnosis and recommend the
121
appropriate treatment.”
The Molloy court accepted this
proposition in its attempt to distinguish the holding in Molloy from
the holding in Fabio:
We agree with the conclusion of the court of appeals on
this point. The misdiagnosis in Fabio caused the plaintiff
immediate injury in the form of a continually growing
cancer, which became more dangerous to the plaintiff
each day it was left untreated. The action accrued at the
time of misdiagnosis because some damage occurred

114. Id. at 763.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 760.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 761.
119. Id. at 762. The statute of limitations for malpractice actions was two years
at that time. MINN. STAT. § 541.07 (1986).
120. Fabio, 504 N.W.2d at 762.
121. Molloy v. Meier, 679 N.W.2d 711, 721 (Minn. 2004) (citing Fabio, 504
N.W.2d at 762).
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immediately. In the case of failure to diagnose Fragile X,
however, the error does not directly damage the patient
and but for the fact that she conceived another child,
122
Molloy would have suffered no damage. . . .
The court reasoned that a claim based on negligence in failing to
diagnose a genetic condition in a child accrues on the date of
conception of a subsequent child because no damage occurs until
123
that date. In Molloy, M.M. was conceived in September 1997 and
the action was commenced in August 2001, falling within the four124
year statute of limitations.
The attempt to distinguish Molloy and Fabio is based on a
misunderstanding of the holding in Fabio and results in a different
definition of “accrued” as used in Minnesota Statutes section
541.076, depending on whether the action involves a failure to
diagnose a genetic condition (“legal” damage is required) or a
failure to diagnose cancer (only “some” damage, the presence of
cancer cells, is required). The “some” damage definition of accrual
in the delay of diagnosis of cancer cases is, however, directly
125
contrary to the holding in Leubner v. Sterner;
a tumor’s
“unchecked growth” is not considered legal damages unless there is
also proof that it is more probable than not that plaintiff will not
126
survive her cancer because of the “unchecked growth.”
In most cases involving a misdiagnosis of cancer, no “legal”
damage occurs until the passage of time causes the patient’s
prognosis to change from a probability of survival (with timely
127
treatment) to a probability of death (with delayed treatment).
Leubner very clearly held that a negligent misdiagnosis case does not
exist until some legal damage occurs even though the presence of
cancer cells in the patient’s body causes “some harm” on the date
128
of misdiagnosis.
Accordingly, there is an inconsistency in the
definition of accrual in a misdiagnosis of cancer cause of action. A
plaintiff in such a case must establish legal harm, as defined by

122. Id. at 722.
123. Id.; see Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.W.2d 169, 174–75 (Minn.
1977).
124. Molloy, 679 N.W.2d at 722.
125. 493 N.W.2d 119 (Minn. 1992).
126. Id. at 121.
127. See, e.g., Leubner v. Sterner. 493 N.W.2d 119 (Minn. 1992).
128. Id. at 121; see also Dalton v. Dow Chem. Co., 280 Minn. 147, 154, 158
N.W.2d 580, 585 (1968) (quoting Brush Beryllium Co. v. Meckley, 284 F.2d 797,
800 (6th Cir. 1960) (cause of action accrues when plaintiff sustains some damage)).
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Leubner, in order to survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim for relief. In contrast, a defendant bringing a motion for
summary judgment based upon the statute of limitations would
only have to establish “some damage,” the presence of cancer cells.
In Molloy, the supreme court tacitly approved the “some damage”
rule of accrual without analyzing whether plaintiff sustained “legal
129
damage” as defined by Luebner.
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF MOLLOY
A. Legal Duty
The holding in Molloy recognizes a legal duty on the part of a
physician ordering genetic tests, and extends that duty to the
130
patient’s biological parents who are in the child-bearing years.
The court specifically reserved for another time, however, the issue
131
of whether the duty extends to other relatives.
Clearly, the
existence of the Fragile X gene in a child could have genetic
implications for other relatives such as siblings of the child’s
biological parents. Applying the foreseeability of harm rule, one
could argue that it is foreseeable that other relatives would be
harmed by negligence in performing the genetic counseling role.
The Molloy decision raises such questions as whether the duty
extends to other relatives, and whether the duty is satisfied by
advising the biological parents of all genetic implications.
Perhaps these issues will be determined by the standards of
practice that develop in response to Molloy. If physicians who
perform genetic testing establish a standard of care of notifying
biological parents, following the court’s rationale in Molloy, the
duty would then be limited to biological parents. In the alternative,
this is an issue that might be appropriate for legislation. Following
132
the 1984 decision of Lundgren v. Fultz, and the 1982 decision of
133
Cairl v. State, the legislature enacted Minnesota Statutes section
148.975. This statute defines the duty to warn a third party of a
134
violent threat made by a patient and also established that a

129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

Molloy, 679 N.W.2d at 721–22.
Id. at 719–20.
Id. at 720.
354 N.W.2d 25 (Minn. 1984).
323 N.W.2d 20 (Minn. 1982).
MINN. STAT. § 148.975, subd. (2) (2004).
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practitioner had immunity if he or she made a good faith effort to
warn against or take precautions against a patient’s violent
135
behavior. In the genetic counseling arena, such legislation could
identify the scope of the duty and provide that the duty is satisfied
by providing the information to a defined class of relatives such as
the parents and siblings of the patient. Such legislation would have
136
to take into account the potential privacy issues as well.
B. Statute of Limitations
The Molloy court’s holding that the cause of action does not
accrue until conception could result in a timely action being
commenced several years after the medical treatment ended.
Accordingly, concerns regarding stale claims and the ability to
provide an adequate defense will exist. Perhaps a solution to this
issue would be a statute of repose that would require any such
claims be commenced within a certain number of years of the date
treatment terminated.
An equally perplexing problem created by Molloy is reconciling
the difference between “accrual” of an action for failure to
diagnose a genetic condition and “accrual” of an action for failure
to diagnose cancer. The application of the rule that a cause of
action does not accrue until “legal” damage occurs would require
the court to overrule Fabio and modify its suggestion that “some”
damage, the unchecked growth of cancer, is sufficient for accrual
for statute of limitations purposes. Instead, the court would need
to hold that an action arising from a delay in the diagnosis of
cancer will not accrue until the patient sustains the legal damages
as set forth in Leubner. That is, there can be no accrual until the
patient’s prognosis changes from a probability of survival to a
probability of death.

135. MINN. STAT. § 148.975, subd. (8) (2004).
136. The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), passed
by Congress in late 1996, includes patient privacy protections designed to
safeguard the security and confidentiality of health information.
Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320a-7c to –7e (1996).
The legislation does not restrict the ability of doctors and other health care
providers to share information that is required for patient treatment. Id. If
legislation were passed requiring the distribution of the results of genetic testing
to an identified class, providers would be well advised to provide notice to their
patients on the potential use of their identifiable medical information and their
rights in this regard.
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V. CONCLUSION
The Molloy decision breaks new ground in Minnesota by
determining that medical practitioners who perform genetic
testing owe a legal duty of care to persons other than the patient
being tested. That duty now extends to biological parents of the
patient. In addition, the Molloy court adopts a definition of accrual
that looks to the date actual legal harm occurs. Unfortunately, the
court’s attempt to distinguish Fabio has created uncertainty. This
uncertainty will require further analysis by the supreme court in
future decisions.
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